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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Pooling microdata from five Australian censuses, I explore the relationship between child 
gender and divorce. By contrast with the United States, I find no evidence that the gender 
of the first child has a significant impact on the decision to marry or divorce. However, 
among two-child families, parents with two children of the same sex are 1.7 percentage 
points less likely to be married than parents with a boy and a girl. Surveys of parental 
attitudes suggest that this effect is more likely to be driven by fathers than by mothers. 
This finding is not consistent with theories of preference for sons over daughters, 
differential costs, role models or complementary costs, but is consistent with a theory of 
parity preference. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Does the gender of their children affect parents’ decision to marry or divorce? While 
researchers have long documented a preference for sons in developing countries, more 
recent studies have shown that the same is true in the United States. US parents with 
daughters are more likely to divorce if they are married at the time of the birth, and less 
likely to marry if they are unmarried at the time of the birth. 
 
Another possibility is that parents are concerned with the sex combination of their 
children. A spate of studies have shown the existence of “parity progression”, by which 
parents with two children of the same gender are more likely to have a third child. 
Given this pattern, it is also possible that the sex combination of the children affects the 
decision to marry or divorce. 
 
In this paper, I explore the relationship between children’s gender and parents’ marital 
status, using a large sample of from several censuses. This paper is innovative in two 
respects. First, it uses data from Australia, a country where the relationship between 
child gender and marital status has not been explored in using a large number of 
observations. Second, it takes account not only of the number of boys and girls in a 
family, but also allow for the possibility of parity preference – that instead of preferring 
one sex over another, parents might instead prefer to have children of both sexes than 
children of the same sex.  
 
To preview the results, I do not find evidence that the gender of the first child affects 
the decision to marry or divorce in Australia. However, there is strong evidence that 
parity preference affecting marriage patterns. Compared to parents with a boy and a 
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girl, parents with two children of the same sex are 1.7 percentage points less likely to 
marry if they are unmarried. Turning to attitudinal data, I find suggestive evidence that 
most of this effect is driven by fathers, rather than by mothers. 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section II briefly reviews the 
relevant literature. Section III outlines a simple theoretical model of the effect of child 
gender on marital status. Section IV presents the census data and empirical results. 
Section V analyses attitudinal data, and the final section concludes. 
 
II. Previous Research 
 
This analysis is grounded in the theoretical work of Becker (1973, 1974) and Becker, 
Landes and Michael (1997), which characterizes individuals as maximizing utility by 
choosing whether to marry, and whether to remain married, subject to uncertainty. A 
couple is assumed to terminate a marriage if the expected utility of remaining married 
falls below the expected utility in the separated state. Children are regarded as 
providing utility to parents, but that utility need not be the same for boys and girls.  
 
In the US, several studies have focused on the question of whether parents of daughters 
are more likely to divorce. Most early studies exploited datasets that provided 
information on marital history. Using data from the 1980 Current Population Survey 
(CPS), Morgan, Lye and Condran (1988) find that parents of daughters were 6 percent 
more likely to have their first marriage end in divorce. Using the 1980 US Census, 
which contained information on marital history, Bedard and Deschene (2005) and 
Ananat and Michaels (2004) find that daughters increased the risk of divorce by 4 
percent and 3 percent respectively. Supplementing Morgan, Lye and Condran (1988) 
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with data from the 1985, 1990 and 1995 CPS, Morgan and Pollard (2002) find no 
effect of child gender on divorce in the post-1980 CPS samples, and argue that this 
reflects a change in parental response to child gender.  
 
An alternative approach is that of Dahl and Moretti (2004), who pool the 1940-2000 
US Censuses, and look at current marital status instead of marital history. This has the 
advantage of greatly increasing the sample size, but the disadvantage that in observing 
only current marital status, divorce effects may by attenuated by remarriage. Dahl and 
Moretti conclude that daughters are 1 percent more likely to reside with a currently 
divorced or separated mother or father. Their effects are largest in the 1940-80 census 
samples, and they do not find a significant impact of the gender of the first girl on 
marital status in the 1990 and 2000 census samples. 
 
Studies focusing on countries other than the US have generally failed to find any 
relationship between child gender and divorce. Across eighteen European countries, 
using data from the 1980s and 1990s, Diekmann and Schmidheiny (2004) find no 
consistent relationship between child gender and divorce. In Canada, Wu (1995) and 
Wu and Penning (1997) find no statistically significant impact of child gender on 
divorce or cohabitation. In Australia, the only relevant study on child gender and 
marital stability (Bracher et al 1993) found no significant relationship. The authors did 
not report the coefficient on child gender or its standard error, but with a sample of 
only around 2500, it is possible that their study was unable to reject large effects in 
either direction. 
 
Another relevant literature is that relating to parity progression. A consistent finding in 
the demographic and economic literature is that US parents with two same-sex 
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children are more likely to have a third child than parents who have both a boy and a 
girl (Ben-Porath and Welch 1976; Pebley and Westoff 1982; Angrist and Evans 1998). 
The same is true in Australia (Young 1977; Gray and Evans 2004; Kippen, Gray and 
Evans 2005), Denmark (Jacobsen, Møller and Englholm 1999), and Sweden 
(Schullström, 1996). Attitudinal data paint a similar picture – parents consistently say 
that if they were to have two children, they would prefer to have both a son and a 
daughter.  
 
A variety of studies have explored parental preferences for sons versus daughters. 
When parents are asked whether they would prefer a son or a daughter, there is a clear 
preference for sons in the US (Pollard and Morgan 2002), most European countries 
(Hank and Kohler 2000), and other developed nations (Marleau and Saucier 2002). For 
example, Dahl and Moretti (2004) report evidence from Gallup polls conducted in the 
US over the period 1941-2003, and find that US respondents consistently say that if 
they could only have one child, they would prefer a son to a daughter. A 1997 
International Gallup poll on the same question found a preference for sons over 
daughters in 13 of the 16 countries surveyed. In general, men’s preference for sons is 
substantially stronger than women’s preference for sons.  
 
The only Australian survey I have been able to find on this issue is a study by Weston 
et al (2004), who ask respondents about the factors that were most important to them in 
deciding whether to have children.1 Among the possible responses were “have at least 
one/another boy” and “have at least one/another girl”. Australian men are more likely 
to say that having a boy was important (23 percent) than they are to say that having a 
girl was important (18 percent). Conversely, women are more likely to say that having 
                                                 
1 I am grateful to Edith Gray for drawing this study to my attention. 
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a girl was important (16 percent) than to say that having a boy was important (12 
percent). Among childless respondents, women are almost indifferent between boys 
and girls (13 percent boys, 14 percent girls), while men’s preferences are strongly in 
favor of boys (25 percent boys, 19 percent girls).2  
 
Lastly, a series of papers by Shelly Lundberg and coauthors focus on the effect of child 
gender on parental time use. In both the US (Lundberg and Rose 2002; Lundberg 
2005a) and Germany (Choi, Joesch and Lundberg 2005), the birth of a son appears to 
have a positive impact on fathers’ labor supply that is substantially larger than the 
effect of the birth of a daughter. Exploring time use patterns in the US, Lundberg 
(2005b) finds that highly educated parents devote more childcare time to young sons. 
Looking only at very young children, Lundberg, McLanahan and Rose (2005) find that 
fathers are more likely to play with, diaper, and feed sons than daughters, while 
mothers’ interact similarly with sons and daughters. Having sons also appears to 
increase parental happiness in the US. Lundberg (2006) reports on several studies 
indicating that husbands and wives with sons report higher levels of marital 
satisfaction than do parents with only daughters.3
 
III. A Simple Model of Child Gender and Divorce 
 
The theoretical model adapts that of Dahl and Moretti (2004), who assume that both 
husband and wife have transferable utility functions of the form h(BBt,Gt,Ct)+Xt, where 
BtB
                                                
 and Gt denote the number of boys and girls in the household at time t, Ct denotes 
non-transferable utility, and Xt denotes transferable utility. As they point out, 
 
2 Weston et al (2004) also find large gaps in boy/girl preferences among respondents aged 20-29 (men 
favored boys by 30% to 22%, women favored girls by 19% to 12%), and among respondents whose 
highest level of education was year 12 or less (men favored boys by 31% to 25%, women favored girls 
by 18% to 15%).  
3 Barnett and Baruch, 1986; Katzev et al., 1994; Cox et al, 1999; Mizell and Steelman, 2000. 
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transferable utility functions have the advantage that one can ignore issues of 
allocation and bargaining power, and can simply consider the sum of utility of the two 
partners.  
 
Where εt is a normally distributed, mean-zero, marriage-specific shock, M and U 
denote married and unmarried states, and the weights attached to boys and girls in the 
married and unmarried states are denoted αi and βi respectively, Dahl and Moretti 
express the couple’s utility in period t as: 
 
U(αiBBt+β Gi t, Ct) + Xt + I[i=M]*εt i=M,U       (1) 
 
Where p, q and s are the prices of boys, girls and nontransferable consumption, 
transferable consumption is the numeraire good, and Yt is combined income, the 
combined period budget constraint is: 
 
pBt + qGt + sCt + Xt = Yt           (2) 
 
For simplicity, Dahl and Moretti assume that prices and income are the same in both 
married and unmarried states, and that the budget constraint holds with equality in each 
period (ie. no borrowing or saving). 
 
A key assumption underlying Dahl and Moretti’s functional form is that the effect of 
boys and girls on parents’ utility is additively separable. To relax this assumption 
somewhat, I add the interaction term BGt, and its utility weight γi, so the utility 
function becomes: 
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U(αiBB
                                                
t+β Gi t+γ BGi t, Ct) + Xt + I[i=M]*εt i=M,U      (3) 
 
With the interaction term, the combined period budget constraint is: 
 
pBt + qGt + rBGt + sCt + Xt = Yt          (4) 
 
where r is the additional cost associated with having children of different sexes. 
 
Following Dahl and Moretti, I can explore the implications of three hypotheses – 
gender bias, role model, and differential cost – in this somewhat extended model.  
(i) The gender bias hypothesis suggests that parents prefer one gender over 
another. For example, if parents have a preference for sons, this implies that 
αM>βM. In its ordinary form, the gender bias hypothesis implies that γM=0. 
(ii) The role model hypothesis involves sex-specialization in parenting. For 
example, that fathers are better at raising boys. Since courts typically grant 
custody to mothers, altruistic parents will take into account the gender of their 
parents when deciding whether to separate. Under the example in which 
parents regard fathers as better at raising boys, this implies that αD<βD. The role 
model hypothesis implies that γD=0. 
(iii) The differential cost hypothesis is that the monetary cost of raising boys and 
girls differs. For example, if girls are more expensive than boys, then p<q. This 
hypothesis implies that r=0.4 
 
Note that each of the above hypotheses imply that the coefficient on the interaction 
term equals zero. To take account of the interaction term, I add two hypotheses to those 
 
4 In the US, Olsen (1983) estimates that for one-child families, a girl costs around $900 each year more 
to raise up to the age of 18 than a boy. I have been unable to obtain similar evidence for Australia. 
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listed above. 
(iv) The parity preference hypothesis posits that the utility of parents with two or 
more children is related to whether they have both boys and girls. For example, 
if parents prefer to have at least one boy and one girl, γM=0.  
(v) The complementary cost hypothesis suggests that the cost of child-rearing is 
related to whether the family has both boys and girls. For example, if toys and 
clothes are more easily passed down when children are of the same sex, then 
for families with two children, one might expect that r<0. 
 
IV. Census Data and Results 
 
The main empirical analysis focuses on the effect of child gender on parents’ marital 
status in Australia. To maximize statistical power, microdata from all the available 
census samples are pooled together. The Australian census is conducted every five 
years, and since 1981, the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) has made available 1 
percent samples of the full census. I combine the 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996 and 2001 
census samples. 
 
The dependent variable is the marital status of the adults in each family. To determine 
this, I use as the dependent variable the marital status of the household reference 
person. The census records the ‘registered marital status’ of each adult, according to 
five categories: never married, widowed, divorced, separated and married. Widows 
and widowers are excluded, and divorced and separated are coded together. Among 
those with any children, 79 percent are married, 10 percent are divorced or separated, 
and 11 percent are never married.5 If parents with daughters are more likely to divorce, 
                                                 
5 According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics, the proportion of ex-nuptial births was 13.2% in 1981 
and 30.7% in 2001: “Population-Births” in Year Book 2004, Cat No 1301.0. 
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then one should expect to see more girls living in households with a divorced head. If 
parents with daughters are less likely to marry after their child is born, more girls 
should be observed living in households with a never-married household head. Both 
effects would lead one to expect to see more girls living in a household with an 
unmarried head (where unmarried can be divorced, separated or never married).6
 
The independent variable of interest is the gender of the children in a family.7 Since the 
census only provides data on children and adults in the same family, it is desirable to 
minimize the possibility that the eldest child has left home. I therefore exclude from 
the sample families in which the reference person is aged under 18 or over 40, and 
those in which the youngest child is aged over 12.8 The final sample consists of 61,025 
families. Of these, 29 percent have only one child, 43 percent have two children, and 
28 percent have three or more children. I observe clear evidence of parity progression – 
among families with three or more children, the first two children are the same sex in 
55 percent of cases (in the absence of parity progression, one would expect this 
probability to be 50 percent). 
 
Since the gender of a child is random, the primary regression specifications are 
                                                 
6 A preferable approach would have been to construct an “ever divorced” variable. However, I am only 
able to construct such a variable for the 1981 and 1986 censuses. 
7 Children are identified as family members aged 18 or younger, coded as “dependent child” or 
“dependent student”.  
8 These age restrictions are the same as those used by Dahl and Moretti (2004), and are aimed at 
maximizing the number of completed fertility spells in the sample. Taking account of the youngest child 
in the family exploits the fact that the spacing of the first and second children is almost always less 5 
years or less. Note that the parental age restriction of 40 or younger is based on the age of the family 
reference person. I cannot exclude on the basis of the mother’s age, since this would involve dropping 
all single parent father-headed households, a characteristic strongly related to the gender of the children. 
One alternative approach would have been to apply a more stringent age restriction on the reference 
person. For example, in place of the restriction on the age of the youngest child, I could restrict the 
reference person to 33 years old or younger. When I do so, the results are qualitatively similar, but this 
approach reduces the sample size by about one-third. Another alternative would have been to exclude 
families in which the number of “total issue” differs from the number of dependent children in the 
household. However, this has the drawback that total issue has a low top-code in the 1986 and 1996 
census samples, and is missing in the 1991 and 2001 census samples.  
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straightforward.9 For the most part, the specifications take the form of estimating the 
effect of some children’s gender on the reference person’s marital status. Following the 
model in Section III, I estimate the effect on marital status of the number of boys (Bt), 
the number of girls (Gt), and the interaction between the two (BGt): 
 
Pr(i=M) = F(BB
                                                
t, Gt, BGt) + εt    i=M,U; i=M,D; i=M,N   (5) 
 
As above, M denotes married and U denotes unmarried (either divorced/separated or 
never married). D denotes divorced or separated (in this specification, those who are 
never married are excluded). N denotes never married (in this specification, those who 
are divorced or separated are excluded).  In each case, I estimate the regression using 
a probit model.  
 
To begin, I estimate the effect of the sex of a child on marital status, using as the 
dependent variable the proportion of children who are girls. This variable takes the 
values {0,1} in a one-child family, {0,½,1} in a two-child family, and {0,1/3, 2/3,1} in a 
three-child family. To remove the effects of family size, the regressions are estimated 
separately by family size. In the case of families larger than three children, I focus only 
on the sex of the first three children. 
 
Table 1 shows the results of this regression, for families with any number of children, 
one-child, two-children and three-children (columns 1-4), and for unmarried versus 
 
9 For a detailed discussion of sex-selection technology and the laws governing its use in Australia, see 
Kippen, Gray and Evans (2005). They point out that sex-selective abortion is likely to be rare in 
Australia, since 99% abortions/assisted miscarriages are carried out within the first trimester of 
pregnancy, prior to the point at which fetal gender can be determined. For parents using in vitro 
fertilization, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis can facilitate sex-selection, but its use for non-medical 
purposes is illegal in three Australian states (South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia). 
Following a 2005 ruling by the Australian Health Ethics Committee, IVF clinics in other states have 
agreed not to use the technology for non-medical reasons. Prior to the ruling, it is estimated that around 
250 couples used the technology for non-medial reasons (Robotham 2005). 
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married (Panel A), divorced versus married (Panel B), and never married versus 
married (Panel C). In none of these specifications is the proportion of girls in a family 
statistically significant at conventional levels. In the specifications with all families, 
one-child families, and two-child families, the coefficients and standard errors are 
sufficiently small that I can reject (at the 5 percent level of significance) effects of 
more than plus or minus one percentage point. 
 
Table 1: Proportion of Girls and Parents’ Marital Status 
Panel A: Dependent variable is unmarried (1) or married (0)
Number of Children Any 1 2 3 
Proportion Girls  0.0015 -0.0012 -0.0008 0.0131 
 [0.0042] [0.0070] [0.0068] [0.0092] 
Observations 61069 17737 26010 17322 
Pseudo R2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 
Observed Prob. 0.2104 0.3268 0.1675 0.1555 
Panel B: Dependent variable is divorced/separated (1) or married (0)
Number of Children Any 1 2 3 
Proportion Girls 0.001 0.0011 -0.0028 0.0078 
 [0.0036] [0.0060] [0.0057] [0.0080] 
Observations 54457 13971 24147 16339 
Pseudo R2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 
Observed Prob. 0.1145 0.1454 0.1032 0.1047 
Panel C: Dependent variable is never married (1) or married (0)
Number of Children Any 1 2 3 
Proportion Girls 0.0009 -0.0024 0.002 0.0075 
 [0.0035] [0.0068] [0.0051] [0.0065] 
Observations 54834 15706 23517 15611 
Pseudo R2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 
Observed Prob. 0.1206 0.2398 0.0792 0.063 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively. Panel B excludes never married. Panel C excluded divorced or separated.  
 
I now estimate a second model, replacing the Proportion Girls variable with an 
indicator variable denoting whether all the children are of the same sex. Since this 
 12
variable is always unity for one-child families, Table 2 shows regression results only 
for two-child and three-child families. Panel A indicates that in two-child families 
where both children are of the same sex, parents are 1.7 percentage points less likely to 
be married than in two-child families with both a boy and a girl. Since the baseline 
probability is 16.75 percent, this indicates that children’s gender can account for 
around 10 percent of the variation in marital status among two-child families – a 
surprisingly large effect. 
 
The next two panels of Table 2 break down the effect into divorce (Panel B) and failing 
to marry (Panel C). The Children Same Sex coefficient in Panel B is insignificant, 
while the Children Same Sex coefficient in Panel C is positive and statistically 
significant. This suggests that the effect is driven primarily by parents with two 
same-sex children not marrying, rather than by such families divorcing.  
 
For three-child families, the Children Same Sex coefficients are insignificant in all 
specifications, but the standard errors are sufficiently large that I cannot reject effects 
in either direction. It is probably not surprising that the effects do not persist from 
two-child to three-child families. Conditional on having two children, both being of the 
same sex is a random event. But three-child families in which all children are of the 
same sex were at one point a two-child family with both children of the same sex. If 
parents with two same-sex children have a higher chance of separation (as the results 
in the first column of Table 2 suggest), then parents who go on to have three same-sex 
children will have a higher propensity to marry. 
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Table 2: Whether Children are the Same Sex and Parents’ Marital Status 
Panel A: Dependent variable is unmarried (1) or married (0)
Number of Children 2 3 
Children Same Sex 0.0167*** -0.0088 
 [0.0047] [0.0071] 
Observations 25969 12598 
Pseudo R2 0.0005 0.0001 
Observed Prob. 0.1677 0.15 
Panel B: Dependent variable is divorced/separated (1) or married (0)
Number of Children 2 3 
Children Same Sex 0.0054 -0.0097 
 [0.0039] [0.0061] 
Observations 24091 11906 
Pseudo R2 0.0001 0.0003 
Observed Prob. 0.1028 0.1006 
Panel C: Dependent variable is never married (1) or married (0)
Number of Children 2 3 
Children Same Sex 0.0147*** -0.0002 
 [0.0036] [0.0050] 
Observations 23493 11400 
Pseudo R2 0.0013 0 
Observed Prob. 0.0799 0.0607 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively. Panel B excludes never married. Panel C excluded divorced or separated. 
 
As a robustness check, Table 3 shows results including controls for family income 
quintile, a quadratic in reference person age, number of years of education of the 
reference person, and an indicator for the census year. 10  If child gender was 
                                                 
10 One might also be concerned that the results presented here do not reflect the effect of the gender of 
the first two children on marital status, but what might be called “sample attrition through parity 
progression”. To take an extreme example, suppose that having a third child required: (a) two same-sex 
children, and (b) married parents. In this case, families with precisely two same-sex children would be 
more likely to be unmarried, even if the gender of the first two children had no direct impact on marital 
status. To test this theory, I estimate the effect of the first two children being of the same sex on marital 
status, with the sample being those with two or more children. The coefficients are smaller than those 
shown in the first column of Table 2 (0.006 when the dependent variable is 1 unmarried or 0 married, 
and 0.007 when the dependent variable is 1 never married or 0 married), but still statistically significant. 
I am grateful to Shelly Lundberg for suggesting this additional robustness check to me. 
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non-random, one might expect this to have a significant impact on the coefficients. 
Instead, adding controls has the effect of inflating the standard errors, but does not 
have a major impact on the coefficients. Across all families, Proportion Girls remains 
positive but statistically insignificant, while in two-child families, the coefficient on 
Children Same Sex in two-child families attenuates slightly, but remains statistically 
significant.  
 15
 
Table 3: Child Gender and Parents’ Marital Status 
Controlling for Parental Demographics 
Panel A: Dependent variable is unmarried (1) or married (0)
Number of Children Any 2 
Proportion Girls 0.0025  
 [0.0043]  
Children Same Sex  0.0093** 
  [0.0045] 
Observations 54528 23210 
Pseudo R2 0.2219 0.2161 
Observed Prob. 0.2123 0.1694 
Panel B: Dependent variable is divorced/separated (1) or married (0)
Number of Children Any 2 
Proportion Girls 0.0018  
 [0.0032]  
Children Same Sex  0.0034 
  [0.0034] 
Observations 48601 21546 
Pseudo R2 0.1713 0.1834 
Observed Prob. 0.1163 0.1053 
Panel C: Dependent variable is never married (1) or married (0)
Number of Children Any 2 
Proportion Girls 0.0009  
 [0.0026]  
Children Same Sex  0.0059*** 
  [0.0022] 
Observations 48877 20942 
Pseudo R2 0.3087 0.3019 
Observed Prob. 0.1213 0.0795 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively. Panel B excludes never married. Panel C excluded divorced or separated. All 
regressions control for family income quintile, a quadratic in reference person age, the number of years 
of education of the reference person, and an indicator for the census year. 
 
Since both Morgan and Pollard (2002) and Dahl and Moretti (2004) find that the effect 
of child gender on marital status is much less pronounced in the 1990s and 2000s than 
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in earlier decades, it is useful to explore whether the same pattern emerges in Australia. 
In Table 4, I compare the effects across census years. For reasons of space, the 
dependent variable is unmarried versus married (since this captures both divorce 
effects and never married effects). Two specifications are presented – the effect of the 
proportion of girls for all families, and the effect of two same-sex children in two-child 
families. 
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Table 4: Child Gender and Parents’ Marital Status Across Censuses 
Dependent variable is unmarried (1) or married (0) 
 1981 Census 1986 Census
Number of 
Children 
Any 2 Any 2 
Proportion Girls 0.0000  -0.005  
 [0.0079]  [0.0087]  
Children Same Sex  0.0029  0.0204** 
  [0.0080]  [0.0093] 
Observations 13212 5691 12746 5508 
Pseudo R2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0011 
Observed Prob. 0.1367 0.1014 0.1703 0.1362 
 1991 Census 1996 Census
Number of 
Children 
Any 2 Any 2 
Proportion Girls 0.0102  -0.0176*  
 [0.0085]  [0.0103]  
Children Same Sex  0.0014  0.0252** 
  [0.0090]  [0.0117] 
Observations 11269 4787 12324 5129 
Pseudo R2 0.0002 0.0000 0.0002 0.0008 
Observed Prob. 0.1448 0.1097 0.2836 0.2254 
 2001 Census   
Number of 
Children 
Any 2   
Proportion Girls 0.0223**    
 [0.0110]    
Children Same Sex  0.0303**   
  [0.0129]   
Observations 11518 4854   
Pseudo R2 0.0003 0.001   
Observed Prob. 0.325 0.2773   
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively.  
 
For the most part, child gender does not have a statistically significant effect on marital 
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status when considering the census samples individually. Families with more girls are 
less likely to be unmarried in 1996 (significant at the 10 percent level), and more likely 
to be unmarried in 2001 (significant at the 5 percent level). In two-child families, 
Children Same Sex is positive and significant in 1986, 1996 and 2001 (all at the 5 
percent level). Together, these coefficients suggest that the effect of child gender on 
marital status has grown stronger in Australia over time – the opposite trend to that 
observed in the United States.  
 
As a further check, the Appendix shows the results of a more flexible functional form, 
looking at all combinations of child gender, and comparing these results with those of 
Dahl and Moretti (2004). In general, the results for Australia are not statistically 
significant. While the coefficient on the sex of the first child is positive, the 
coefficients on having two girls (against the counterfactual of two boys) and on having 
three girls (against the counterfactual of three boys) are sensitive to the choice of 
specification. 
 
V. Attitudinal Surveys 
 
To further explore the effect of child gender on marital stability, I turn to a different 
type of evidence – survey data on parental behavior and attitudes towards children. 
Since the census does not include the relevant questions, the Household, Income and 
Labour Dynamics in Australia survey (HILDA) is used instead. HILDA is a four-wave 
panel dataset covering 2001-04, and questions are taken from all available waves (for 
more information on HILDA, see Watson 2005).11 As with the results in the previous 
                                                 
11 With only a four-year panel, I do not have sufficient births to observe the change in parental attitudes 
before and after childbirth, so I only exploit the cross-sectional nature of the data. This is also more 
straightforward, since the focus is on the combination of children, rather than the effect of a new child. 
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section, the fact that child gender is random means that such an approach should not 
bias the results. 
 
For reasons of comparability, I apply the same sample restrictions as in the previous 
section – focusing on parents aged between 18 and 40, with at least one child aged 12 
or under.12 The sample is then further restricted to families with two resident children. 
Although HILDA contains data on non-resident children, the focus here is on the effect 
of child gender on attitudes and time use. I therefore take account only of resident 
children. Among those with two children, 74 percent are married, 7 percent are 
divorced or separated, and 19 percent are never married.  
 
Note that since the HILDA questions for the most part ask about resident children, 
divorce or separation may lead to attenuation bias. In a dichotomous model, for 
example if same-sex children either cause parents to angrily separate or happily stay 
together, I should observe no effects. However, it is more likely that the effect of child 
gender is on a continuum, in which case it should be possible to learn something about 
the effect of child gender on marital status from observing parents who are living 
together.  
 
I estimate the effect of child gender on six outcomes: 
• Log usual weekly work hours in all jobs 
• Log weekly time (in minutes) spent playing with children 
• Satisfaction with partner (scaled from 0-10) 
• “I often feel tired, worn out or exhausted from meeting the needs of children” 
(scaled from 1-7) 
                                                 
12 Since HILDA contains information on the parentage of each child, I am are able to correctly code 
children in blended families. 
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• “I find that taking care of my children is much more work than pleasure” 
(scaled from 1-7) 
• “Do fair share of looking after children” (scaled from 1-5)13 
 
Table 5 shows the results from these specifications, with the first two dependent 
variables estimated using OLS, and the last four using ordered logit. 
 
Table 5: Whether Children Are Same Sex and Parental Behavior 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable: 
Log work 
hours 
Log time 
with 
children 
Satisfaction 
with partner 
Children 
make me 
tired 
Children 
more 
work than 
pleasure 
Do fair 
share of 
looking 
after 
children 
Panel A: Mothers       
Children Same Sex -0.0500 0.1342* 0.1235 0.0522 -0.1390 -0.0112 
 [0.0752] [0.0717] [0.1302] [0.1222] [0.1215] [0.0789] 
Observations 923 1515 1890 2078 2078 2072 
R2 or Pseudo R2 0.0026 0.0059 0.0026 0.0019 0.0012 0.2912 
Mean of dep var: 3.094 3.028 8.086 4.881 2.796 2.958 
Panel B: Fathers       
Children Same Sex 0.0350 0.0052 0.0822 0.0647 0.166 0.0795 
 [0.0242] [0.0724] [0.1460] [0.1398] [0.1402] [0.1084] 
Observations 970 948 1355 1327 1328 1322 
R2 or Pseudo R2 0.0114 0.0012 0.0011 0.003 0.001 0.0166 
Mean of dep var: 3.813 2.369 8.325 4.048 2.684 2.984 
Note: Sample is parents aged between 18 and 40, with exactly two children, at least one of whom is aged 
12 or under. Columns 1 and 2 are estimated using OLS. Columns 3-6 are estimated using ordered logit. 
All specifications include year fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered at the person level, in brackets. 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
For the most part, the sex combination of children is not significantly related to 
parental work patterns, time with children, and attitudes towards children. The only 
                                                 
13 Coded from 1 “Does much less than fair share” to 5 “Does much more than fair share” (reversed from 
original). 
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statistically significant coefficient is on mothers’ work time, indicating that mothers 
with two children of the same sex spend on average 13 percent more time with their 
children (significant at the 10 percent level). This suggests that mothers are happier 
with same-sex children, not less happy. The other three coefficients with t-statistics 
above 1 all point in a similar direction: in families with two same-sex children, fathers 
tend to work more, fathers are more likely to think that children are more work than 
pleasure, and mothers are less likely to think that children are more work than pleasure. 
Together, these results indicate that if having two children of the same sex reduces the 
probability of marriage, the impact is more likely to be through the father than the 
mother. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
Combining microdata from five Australian censuses over the period 1981-2001, I 
estimate the effect of child gender on marital stability. Only in the 2001 census is there 
clear evidence that daughters are associated with lower marriage rates. However, there 
is consistent evidence that in two-child families, parents are less likely to be married if 
the children are of the same sex. Most of this effect appears to be driven by 
never-married couples failing to marry, rather than by married couples divorcing. A 
two-child couple with two same-sex children is 1.7 percentage points less likely to be 
married than a couple with a boy or a girl. Child gender can therefore explain 10 
percent of the variation in marital status among two-child families. Attitudinal data 
suggest that most of this impact arises from paternal rather than maternal attitudes.  
 
In modeling the relationship between child gender and parental marital status, five 
theories were proposed: the gender bias hypothesis, the role model hypothesis, the 
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differential cost hypothesis, the parity preference hypothesis, and the complementary 
cost hypothesis. Only the parity preference hypothesis – which posits that parents’ 
utility in marriage is highest when the couple has both a boy and a girl – appears to be 
consistent with the facts observed here. As is well known, couples with two children of 
the same sex are more likely to have a third child than couples with a boy and a girl. 
These results also indicate that some such couples may also pursue an alternative 
strategy – investing less in the relationship by failing to marry or deciding to divorce. 
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Appendix Table 1: Comparing Australia and the United States. Dependent variable is divorced/separated (1) or married (0). 
Panel A: United States (Source: Dahl and Moretti 2004)
Sex of 1st child Families with 1 
child 
Families with 
≥1 child 
Sex order of 
first 2 children 
Families with 2 
children 
Families with 
≥2 children 
Sex order of 
first 3 children 
Families with 3 
children 
Families with 
≥3 children 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Girl -0.0004 0.0011 Girl, Girl 0.0020 0.0025 G, G, G 0.0056 0.0053 
 (0.0006) (0.0003)  (0.0007) (0.0005)  (0.0014) (0.0011) 
   Boy, Girl -0.0048 -0.0011 B, B, G -0.0003 0.0003 
    (0.0006) (0.0005)  (0.0013) (0.0011) 
   Girl, Boy -0.0028 0.0001 B, G, B 0.0062 0.0045 
    (0.0005) (0.0005)  (0.0014) (0.0012) 
      G, B, B 0.0055 0.0049 
       (0.0014) (0.0012) 
      B, G, G 0.0025 0.0029 
       (0.0014) (0.0012) 
      G, B, G 0.0032 0.0025 
       (0.0014) (0.0012) 
      G, G, B 0.0014 0.0021 
       (0.0014) (0.0011) 
All-Boy Baseline 0.1812 0.1360  0.1170 0.1098  0.0980 0.0978 
Percent Effect -0.2% 0.9%  1.7% 2.3%  5.7% 5.4% 
Observations 1,554,818 4,169,265  1,679,127 2,614,447  659,523 935,320 
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Appendix Table 1: Comparing Australia and the United States. Dependent variable is divorced/separated (1) or married (0). 
Panel B: Australia         
Sex of 1st child Families with 1 
child 
Families with 
≥1 child 
Sex order of 
first 2 children 
Families with 2 
children 
Families with 
≥2 children 
Sex order of 
first 3 children 
Families with 3 
children 
Families with 
≥3 children 
Girl 0.0011 0.0035 Girl, Girl -0.0025 0.0024 G, G, G -0.0065 0.008 
 [0.0060] [0.0027]  [0.0057] [0.0043]  [0.0105] [0.0096] 
   Boy, Girl -0.0114 -0.0014 B, B, G 0.0002 0.0065 
    [0.0053] [0.0042]  [0.0103] [0.0093] 
   Girl, Boy -0.0018 0.0048 B, G, B 0.018 0.0247 
    [0.0054] [0.0043]  [0.0118] [0.0106] 
      G, B, B 0.0106 0.0141 
       [0.0115] [0.0101] 
      B, G, G 0.0062 0.0109 
       [0.0115] [0.0103] 
      G, B, G 0.0052 0.0217 
       [0.0114] [0.0106] 
      G, G, B 0.0083 0.0159 
       [0.0108] [0.0098] 
All-Boy Baseline 0.1466 0.1123  0.1036 0.1004  0.0987 0.0939 
Percent Effect 0.8% 3.1%  -2.4% 2.4%  -6.6% 8.5% 
Observations 13,971 54,457  24,147 40,486  11,917 16,339 
Note: “All-Boy Baseline” is the fraction of all-boy families with a currently divorced parent. “Percent effect” is the coefficient in the first row divided by the All-Boy Baseline. 
